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Introduction1
As of 1 January 2008, when the corporate tax reform
took effect, the tax treatment of income in Germany
has undergone major changes. Up to the very end
the reform was viewed with great scepticism by
politicians, the business community and economists.
The most recent comments indicate that a reform of
corporate tax will once again be part of the political
agenda in the coming legislative period (Becker and
Fuest 2007).
What will this controversial tax reform achieve and
why was it passed?
In its basic features the corporate tax reform of 2008
is aimed at both ensuring the international competi-
tiveness of Germany – by reducing the corporate tax
burden – and at securing the German tax base by
expanding the basis of assessment and limiting tax
avoidance strategies. Thus the tax reform is not new
in terms of being a tax-cut-cum base-broadening
measure, but it rather mimics the US 1986 Tax
Reform Act (Joint Committee on Taxation 1986).
Similar kinds of tax-cut-cum base-broadening
reforms have also been introduced in numerous
other European states during the last few years.2,3 In
the light of an increasing European and worldwide
tax competition, a lowering of the corporate income
tax, as envisaged by this 2008 reform, is definitely an
expedient measure. However, every tax rate reduc-
tion results in tax losses so the question must be
raised as to what extent these tax losses can be mean-
ingfully counteracted by expanding the tax base.
As can be seen in Figure 1, Germany’s position
improved considerably after the corporate tax
reform of 2008 was instituted: Before the reform,
Germany ranked among the high tax countries in
Europe with an effective corporate tax burden of
approximately 38.6 percent. After the reform Ger-
many improved its position substantially and is now
located in the middle field with a tax burden of just
under 30 percent. Moreover, the tax relief brought
about by the corporate tax reform of 2008 enabled
Germany to narrow the pre-existing tax rate differ-
ential between Germany and the new EU member
states, which initially offered considerable incentives
for profit shifting and firm relocation.4
The corporate tax reform of 2008
A core element of the corporate tax reform of 2008
was the lowering of the corporate tax rate from
25 percent to 15 percent. Additionally the uniform
trade tax placed on incorporated firms was lowered
from 5 to 3.5 percent (on this base tax rate the
German municipalities set a regionally different fac-
tor that has an average value of about 400 percent, so
that the average tax rate of the trade tax is 14.8 per-
cent) such that the tax burden on retained earnings
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1 The German version of the article was published in ifo Schnell-
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2 Thus Denmark adapted its tax system in 2001 and Italy in 1998
using similar tax-cut-cum-base-broadening reforms to the interna-
tional demands of globalisation (Carone and Salomäki 2001).
3 Even though the tax reform of 2000 was also a hesitant step in the
direction of a tax-cut-cum-base-broadening reform before the cor-
porate tax reform of 2008 was introduced, Germany still ranked
amongst those countries with the highest tax burden for incorpo-
rated firms.
4 With an average tax burden of around 18 percent for incorporat-
ed firms in the new EU member states, the tax differential between
Germany and these states has been reduced from approximately
20 percent to 12 percent as a result of the corporate tax reform
of 2008.
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for incorporated firms was reduced from 38.6 to
29.8 percent (BMF 2006).
Limited partnerships and sole proprietorships,
whose tax burden – with the exception of the trade
tax – is determined at the level of the proprietors
and their personal income tax, do not profit from a
reduction in tax rates, however. On the contrary, the
relief on business income within the framework of
the “tax on the rich” has been eliminated5 and the
top personal income tax rate was increased by three
percentage points to 45 percent. At the same time
there are some changes with respect to the trade tax
for limited partnerships and sole proprietorships.
The effects of these changes, however, depend to a
large degree on the profitability of the respective
firm and the percentage of the basic rate established
by the individual municipality. For example, the pre-
existing graduated rate for the trade tax has been
eliminated. In the past it had set in above the tax free
amount of €24,500 and rose by 1 percentage point
from 1 to 5 percent for every €12,000 of trade earn-
ings.After the reform the trade tax rate amounts – as
for all incorporated firms – uniformly to 3.5 percent.
The tax-free amount of €24,500 has been retained,
however. Furthermore the trade tax credit on
income tax owed was raised according to Section 35
of the German Income Tax Law from 1.8 to 3.8 per-
cent. What is new is that the tax credit is only grant-
ed up to the amount of trade tax actually paid, which
particularly affects those businesses that are located
in municipalities with a factor under 380 percent.6
This measure is meant to pre-
vent tax competition amongst
municipalities to the detriment
of federal income tax authori-
ties. An additional new regula-
tion with respect to trade tax
which affects incorporated firms,
partnerships and sole propri-
etorships is the classification of
trade tax as non-deductible busi-
ness expenses in cases of income,
corporate and trade tax.
The reform also introduced a
favourable tax treatment for
earnings retained by partner-
ships. According to this rule, re-
tained profits could be optionally taxed at a propor-
tional tax rate of merely 28.25 percent (plus solidar-
ity surcharge and, if applicable, church tax) instead
of the personal income tax rate of the entrepreneur.
Withdrawals from these net of tax reserves/retained
earnings are subject to a reduced income tax of
25 percent, whereby these retained profits are as-
sumed to be withdrawn firstly. Other profits, which
were not taxed with the new proportional tax rate
but with the personal income tax rate could be with-
drawn tax free. The latter are assumed to be with-
drawn after the proportionally taxed profits. This
measure thus supports the use of equity capital in
partnerships while adjusting the nominal tax burden
of incorporated firms and partnerships.
A further important part of the reform is the intro-
duction of the so-called Abgeltungssteuer (final with-
holding tax) amounting to 25 percent (plus solidari-
ty surcharge and church tax) on income from capital
– from 2009 onwards. This measure can be viewed as
a tax cut as well as a base-broadening element:
whereas interest income was taxed at the top income
tax rate of 45 percent (for investors in the highest tax
bracket) before the reform, this burden on interest
income dropped by 20 percentage points, after the
reform. Moreover, with the introduction of the with-
holding tax, the Halbeinkünfteverfahren (half-in-
come principle) has been abolished for privately
owned shares. This implies that from 2009 onwards
total dividend income is subject to the withholding
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Source: Schratzenstaller (2007).
TAX BURDEN FOR INCORPORATED FIRMS IN 2007        
in %
(a) After implementation of the 2008 corporate tax reform.
Figure 1
5 According to Section 52, Paragraph 44 of the German Income Tax
Law, Section 32c, which prescribes tax relief on profit income with-
in the framework of the tax on the rich, is to be applied the last time
for the tax assessment period of 2007.
6 With a municipal tax factor of 380 percent, the trade tax burden
amounts to 380 percent of the basic trade rate.At the same time 3.8
of the basic trade rate can be set off of income tax. Since this tax
credit is limited to the tax actually paid, the tax credit is lower than
the maximum factor of 3.8 allows in municipalities where the tax
factor is under 380 percent.
tax of 25 percent.7 Furthermore, capital gains that
previously were tax exempt if shares were sold after
the one-year speculation time limit are now affected
by the final withholding tax as well. Despite this
expansion of the tax base for income from dividends
and capital gains, the marginal tax rate for dividends
in the case of top incomes will rise by only a small
extent.8
If, however, equity holdings in incorporated compa-
nies are held, for example, in the business assets and
liabilities of a general commercial partnership or an
individual business, the profit from capital gains and
dividends as of 2009 is to be taxed according to the so-
called partial-income system. They are then exempt
from income tax at a rate of 40 percent (instead of
previously 50 percent). The final withholding tax does
not apply in this case. For incorporated firms the
existing exemption of capital gains and dividends
from corporate income tax will also hold in the future.
Income from the disposal of investments in incorpo-
rated firms will also be exempt from the final with-
holding tax for personal assets if the investment/hold-
ing amounts to at least 1 percent. Here, too, the par-
tial-income system will be binding as of 2009.
Furthermore the final withholding tax does not
apply if the personal progressive tax rate is more
favourable and the taxed individual chooses not to
be assessed on the basis of the withholding tax.
For 2008 the half-income system will be retained –
despite the reduction of the corporate income tax.
The profits attained in this year and distributed in
advance are thus subject to a very low, historically
unique, tax burden (15 percent corporate tax plus
income tax based on the half-income system).
The broadening of the tax base brought about by the
corporate tax reform of 2008 also involves the trade
tax. Before the reform, 50 percent of the interest
paid on permanent debt was added when taxable
trade earnings were calculated. From now on, 25 per-
cent of all interest paid will be added to the compu-
tation of taxable income. This implies that under the
current system 25 percent of payments for short-
term debts (with the exception of cash discounts and
bonuses) are also included when computing a firm’s
operating profits. Furthermore, 25 percent of the
notional “interest shares” for rent, leasing, licenses
and leasing rates are included independent of the
treatment of the trade tax for the recipient of these
payments.9
It should be noted, however, that there is a tax
allowance of €100,000 when computing the amount
of actual interest and notional “interest shares”.
Furthermore, as we mentioned before, the trade tax
can no longer be deducted as a business expense
under the current tax law.
A further base-broadening element of the reform
regards the deductibility of debt interest within cor-
porate groups. In detail, within corporate groups the
deduction of interest on debt10 for both incorporated
firms as well as partnerships is limited under certain
circumstances to 30 percent of the earnings before
interest expenses, taxes, depreciation and amortiza-
tion (EBITDA). With the help of this thin cap rule
(Zinsschranke), tax avoidance strategies involving
internal loans are limited, and the complete financing
of investments in foreign countries to the detriment
of German profit (BMF 2006) is prevented. In order
not to hinder the external financing of small and mid-
dle-sized firms, the thin cap rule only applies beyond
an allowance of 1 million Euros per year. Moreover
it is not implemented if a corporate group can prove
that the debt ratio of its German affiliates does not
exceed the overall debt ratio of the corporate group
as a whole by more than 1 percent (“escape clause”).
Furthermore the abolition of digressive depreciation
and limiting the immediate write-off of inferior
assets have contributed to an additional broadening
of the tax base.
Implications of the corporate tax reform of 2008
Incentives for the sources of finance and capital
structure of firms
If the interest paid on debt is not or is only partially
deductible from the corporate tax base – as is the
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7 Under the former Halbeinkünfteverfahren (half-income princi-
ple) only half of the dividend income was subject to the personal
income tax.
8 Whereas before the reform dividends were effectively subject to
an actual tax burden of 22.5 percent (in the case of top incomes)
because of the half income principle, after the introduction of the
withholding tax they will be taxed at a flat rate of 25 percent.
9 The legislator defines “interest shares” as a share of rent amount-
ing to 20 percent of movable capital assets, 65 percent of immov-
able assets (particularly rented rooms) and 25 percent of licenses.
That means that the rent for office space – 25% of 65% = 16.25 %
– is now to be included. Subletting, for example within an entire
corporate group, is to be added as gross figures, i.e. the trade tax
will include additions for the tenant as well as for the subtenant.
10 Net interest or interest paid less interest earnings.
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case with the trade tax and interest on debt beyond
the allowance of the thin cap rule – the reform is
reminiscent of the so-called Comprehensive Busi-
ness Income Tax (CBIT).11
In economic terms, the CBIT stands out because it is
neutral with respect to the financing decisions of a
firm, as neither investments financed by external
capital nor by equity capital receive a tax advantage.
Taking into account the personal income tax paid by
the creditor or the shareholder, the financing neu-
trality of the 2008 corporate tax reform is, however,
only achieved if the thin cap rule does not apply.12
Thus, the partial elimination of the tax privilege for
interest paid on debt might result in an increased
cost of debt financing such that some firms are will-
ing to rely more heavily on internal equity financing.
As a consequence the equity ratio of those firms
which are affected by the interest barrier will rise in
the long run.
If, however, one assumes that in many cases the thin
cap rule will not apply, as of 2009 there will be a pref-
erence for debt vis-à-vis equity finance.This is due to
the tax treatment of creditors and its impact on the
cost of capital. For a stockholder – as long as the firm
is not affected by the thin cap rule – it is more prof-
itable for tax purposes to provide a loan to his firm
instead of augmenting the firm’s equity capital.13 In
general, internal equity is more expensive than out-
side capital because creditors have a lower tax bur-
den compared to internal equity holders. In terms of
the trade tax, some novelties regarding the treat-
ment of external capital have also been established.
Only 25 percent instead of the previous 50 percent of
the interest paid on permanent debt is included
when assessing the tax base of the trade tax.
Furthermore an allowance of €100,000 was intro-
duced. Thus, only the tax treatment of short-term
external capital that was previously not included in
the assessment of the trade tax and exceeds the
allowance is negatively affected.
In the light of the structurally weak equity base of
German firms the tax reform seems to be rather
counterproductive. In terms of financing incentives,
the reform does not show a clear tendency. This is
not surprising, however, as neutrality with respect to
the source of finance was not a goal of the corporate
tax reform.
Investment incentives 
From a theoretical perspective, two opposing effects
must be distinguished, when analysing the effects of
the corporate tax reform of 2008 on the investment
behaviour of incorporated firms. On the one hand, the
broadening of the tax base brought about by the par-
tial non-deductibility of debt interest increases the
cost of capital.14 On the other hand, the reduction in
the corporate income tax results in lower capital costs.
From a theoretical point of view it is not clear which of
the two effects dominates: do capital costs decrease
and thus investment incentives increase or is it the
other way around? Since an increase in the costs of
capital influences solely the share of investments
financed via external capital while both sources of
finance – debt and equity– benefit from the lower cor-
porate tax, we expect the costs of capital to fall partic-
ularly for those firms with a low share of debt fi-
nance.15 The calculations of Radulescu und Stimmel-
mayr (2007) indicate that a tax relief for incorporated
firms has a negative effect on investment activities in
the corporate sector.This result can be explained first-
ly by the fact that the thin cap rule counteracts corpo-
rate tax relief. Secondly, the income from dividends
and capital gains is subject to a complete double taxa-
tion due to the introduction of the final withholding
tax. In the past, income from interest was subject
entirely to personal income tax; and dividends, which a
firm had already paid taxes on, were only taxed
according to the half-income system. With the intro-
duction of the withholding tax both sources of income
will be taxed in the future, at a rate of 25 percent (plus
solidarity surcharge and church tax). The entire tax
burden on dividends is higher than that on interest
income, and thus investment in financial capital is tax
favoured vis-à-vis investment in real capital.
Furthermore the introduction of less generous
depreciation rules for real assets has rendered
11 CBIT was developed in the early 1990s by the US Treasury
Department (1992) with the aim of creating a reconciliation of the
financing costs based on own equity capital and capital from out-
side sources. Even though CBIT has not been implemented in a
pure form anywhere, it continues to plays an important role in tax
debates in the US (President’s Advisory Panel on Tax Reform
2006), and now also in Germany.
12 If the marginal investment is subject to a completely non-
deductible interest on debt, then the investment based on both own
equity capital as well as external capital will carry at the corporate
level the same actual corporate tax burden. Since at the level of the
shareholder the uniform final withholding tax applies, the actual
tax burden for marginal investment will be identical for both
sources of finance.
13 See also Endres, Spengel and Reister (2007).
14 The development of external capital costs depends on whether
the thin cap rule applies or not.
15 The lower the external financing share of a firm is, the more like-
ly that the costs of capital will fall as the reduction in the corporate
tax will have a stronger effect than the increased cost of debt.
investments in real capital less attractive. The
expanded tax on non-income values within the trade
tax has sharpened this effect. Leased assets also
increase the tax burden.
Considering this aspect of the reform, it becomes
clear that capital-intensive firms will experience a
smaller tax relief compared to firms with a lower
capital intensity. The state is thus supporting the
structural change to a service-based economy.
Preventing profit shifting
The corporate tax reform of 2008 tries – also in the
light of the international tax competition – to coun-
teract the international profit shifting of multi-
national firms (BMF 2006). If interest paid on
debt is tax deductible, multinational firms are able,
using internal loans, to shift their profit from high
tax countries to low tax countries.16 Even if the
interest income of subsidiaries has to be taxed in
low tax countries, an internal loan of this sort can
be advantageous if the tax rate differential bet-
ween high and low tax countries is sufficiently pro-
nounced.17 If the thin cap rule applies, this me-
chanism can be cut off in the
future. Moreover, the decrease
in the tax burden for the re-
tained profits of incorporated
firms will also reduce the incen-
tive to shift profits. The taxation
of ‘functions’ that are shifted
abroad, as has recently been
formulated in Section 1 of the
Law on External Tax Relations,
will have a similar effect.18
The tax burden of corporate
firms and their shareholders
In the following, we will describe
the change in the tax burden of
corporate firms and their share-
holders since they are primarily
affected by the reform.
Let us consider a limited liability company with a
profit of €55,000. The actual tax burden before and
after the corporate tax reform of 2008 can be seen in
Table 1.To simplify matters, the comparison is based
on the legal situation as of 2009 when the individual
aspects of the reform, including the final withhold-
ing tax, have taken their full effect.19 Additionally,
we assume a uniform tax factor of 400 percent for
the local trade tax and that stockholders do not
receive any other income besides that from their
own firm. Under the 2007 regime, the stockholder
was able to benefit from the half-income taxation of
distributed profits.
The numbers in Table 1 show that the effects of the
reform are particularly noticeable at the corporate
level. Here the tax burden falls by almost ten per-
centage points. If the shareholder level is included,
the result is an increase in the tax burden of more
than five percentage points. This is, of course, a
result of the extreme example: With an income of
€55,000 derived exclusively from firm profits, an
option to be taxed with one’s personal income tax
rate (in other words a permissible circumvention
of the final withholding tax) is not advantageous.
The reason is that with a circumvention of the
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Table 1 
Tax burden for a limited liability company* in 2007 and 2009
Legal situation
of 2007 
Legal situation
of 2009 
Trade tax 9,166.67 7,700.00 
Corporate tax 11,458.33 8,250.00 
Solidarity surcharge on corporate tax 630.21 453.75 
Tax at the corporate level 21,255.21 16,403.75
Actual tax burden in % (corresponds to
taxation of retained profits)
38.65 29.83 
Dividend payout (profit after taxes) 33,744.79 38,596.25
Income tax for shareholder (2007: half-
income system at a tax rate of 42%,
2009: final withholding tax)
2,018.00 9,649.06 
Solidarity surcharge for shareholder 110.99 530.70 
Total tax on distributed profits 23,384.20 26,583.51
Effective tax rate in % 42.52 48.33 
* Annual profit of 55,000 with full profit distribution (trade tax factor of
400%).
Source: Own calculations. 
16 To shift profit via internal debt, the part of the corporate group
located in a high tax country takes on a credit from its subsidiary in
a low tax country. By paying off the debt, the profit of the corpo-
rate group in a high tax country (artificially) reduces its profit and
thus its actual tax load for the firm in the high tax country.
17 According to Weichenrieder (2007) or Huizinga and Laeven
(2007) the profit shifting of multinational firms depends to a large
degree on the bilateral tax rate difference between high and low
tax countries.
18 Section 1 of the Laws on External Tax Returns in the version of
corporate tax reform law stipulates that for business relationships
with associated companies in foreign countries a dealing-at-arm’s-
length rule must hold. The aim is to prevent German profit from
being shifted to foreign countries by charging excessive internal
transfer prices.
19 The burden of non-distributed profits is reached already in 2008.
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capital gains tax, the entire income tax rate applies
and not, as was previously the case, only half of it.20
If in 2007 the shareholder was, already prior to
profit distribution, subject to a marginal income tax
rate of 42 percent, then, in accordance with the half-
income procedure, the marginal tax burden on dis-
tributed profits amounted to 21 percent, whereas it
will reach 25-percent under the withholding tax in
2009. As a consequence the total burden, including
both the level of the corporation and of the share-
holder, amounted to 52.24 percent in 2007 and will
amount to 48.33 percent in 2009. From the tax relief
at the corporation level, nearly 4 percentage points
will accrue to the shareholders.
Thus the income of the shareholder is crucial for
the change in total tax burden: the higher the tax-
able income, the greater the tax relief. The prob-
lematic element here is that the corporate tax
reform does indeed allow the taxpayer to choose
not to be assessed on the basis of the final with-
holding tax, but taxation in this case is not accord-
ing to the partial-income procedure, which should
logically be the case. The legislator has consciously
allowed here a double taxation to occur. Thus, there
is an urgent need to amend the reform to give small
shareholders tax relief; this is also required for sys-
temic reasons.
The conclusion that can be drawn at this point is
that the tax relief for corporations primarily affects
the level of the corporation. Therefore, dividends
and investments in new projects have a tax disad-
vantage vis-à-vis leaving the profits within the com-
pany. The effect of the reform is thus to conserve
existing structures.
The above-mentioned measures affect domestic
investors. For foreign shareholders, who are exclu-
sively interested in the ultimate taxation at the cor-
poration level, the significant reduction in the corpo-
rate tax rate is clearly positive. For small investors
with a low marginal tax rate, however, holding shares
becomes less attractive in terms of taxation.
The effect on partnerships and sole
proprietorships
In addition to the effects of the tax reform on corpo-
rate firms, the impact on partnerships must also be
examined. It is striking that the income tax law has
not undergone any changes comparable to the
reduction of the corporate tax. Instead, the tighten-
ing of the depreciation allowances, in particular, has
had a negative effect on partnerships and sole pro-
prietorships. The tax relief relating to special depre-
ciation allowances brought along by the reform only
provided a small correction, especially since the
elimination of promotion for business start-ups that
existed in the discontinued saving-amortisation
meant a deterioration here, too.
Profit retention
For partnerships and individual proprietorships, the
legislator introduced a profit retention reserve (Art
34a German Income Tax Law) as the “little brother”
of the clearly lowered tax rate for the corporation
tax. This unfortunately was a somewhat bureaucratic
measure. Although retained profits are taxed at the
relatively low rate of 28.25 percent (or 29.8 percent
including the solidarity surcharge), the risks for the
companies are relatively high. If profits enjoying this
tax benefit are subsequently withdrawn, a supple-
mentary tax of 25 percent plus solidarity charge must
be paid. The termination of the business, sale of a
business and conversion to a corporate form are
treated the same way as withdrawals.
The definition of a withdrawal is particularly prob-
lematic: A withdrawal has occurred when the positive
balance of withdrawals and deposits exceeds profits.
Withdrawals thus take place primarily from the prof-
it retention reserve. An example makes this clear:
The individual proprietor Mr. X had a profit of
€100,000 taxed and retained in 2008. In 2009 he made
a deposit to the amount of €150,000. In 2015 he would
like to withdraw €50,000. At the time of withdrawal
his capital is composed of:
Profits in 2008 at a favoured tax rate: €100,000
Deposit in 2009: €150,000
Total capital €250,000
The desired €50,000 must be taken from the profit re-
tention reserve and is subsequently taxed although in
2009 Mr. X (i.e., after building up reserves) had made
20 At €55,000 the average tax rate, at the basic rate, is 27.61%, which
is above the 25% final withholding tax. Opting for a tax assessment
at the normal income tax rate would thus be detrimental. Because
of the test as to what is more advantageous, which the tax office is
required to carry out, it would not even be possible. It has to be
noted that this effect only occurs for small shareholders. If some-
one owns more than 1 percent of a company’s shares under certain
circumstances he can be treated according to the part-income pro-
cedure (Teileinkünfteverfahren). In this case his profit shares are
taxed with 60 percent of his personal income tax rate.
a large deposit. He, however, can only access this
money, after the favoured reserves of €100,000 have
been completely withdrawn.
Since individual proprietors or partners in a partner-
ship – in contrast, for example, to managing partners
of a limited liability firm – cannot, according to tax
law, draw salaries from their companies, in periods
where they make a loss they have to rely on making
withdrawals. In practice, retained profits will thus
hardly play a role.21 They are only worthwhile in
cases of very high profits and very long retention
periods.22
Overall effects of the income and local trade tax
The conclusion we draw with regard to the income tax
is that there is no significant privileged treatment for
the self-employed. Instead, as already mentioned,
from now on business income is also included in the
assessment of the “tax on the rich” of 45 percent.
The effect of the trade tax reform is unclear. On the
one hand, the graduated tax rate and the deductibil-
ity of the trade tax as a business expense were abol-
ished. On the other hand, the tax credit factor on
income tax was raised considerably from 1.8 to 3.8.
Not taking into account the broadening of the tax-
base, e. g., by adding rent expenses to the income, the
effects of the reform clearly depend on the munici-
pal factor of the trade tax. As soon as the municipal
factor exceeds a value of 380 percent, an effective
trade tax burden arises.23 Up to
this threshold, the trade tax bur-
den and the imputed amount are
identical. An overcompensation
from the imputation, as in the
past, is no longer possible, since
the imputation is limited to the
tax actually paid.
Figure 2 depicts the relationship
between the marginal tax bur-
den for a sole proprietorship or
a partnership with a profit of
€55,000 according to the new and
the old law and the tax factor of
the local trade tax.
The graph shows that the reform leads to a reduced tax
burden – including the trade tax, income tax and soli-
darity surcharge – only within a relatively narrow cor-
ridor of a tax factor of the local trade tax of between
325 percent and 460 percent. In the other ranges, the
old law turns out to be more favourable. The average
tax factor for the trade tax in Germany is ca. 433 per-
cent.24 In large cities in particular, it is often much high-
er (Munich tops the list at 490 percent, for example).
Thus, it is precisely the commercial businesses in the
large cities that are worse off after the reform.
If the partners of a partnership or an individual pro-
prietor file separately for individual income tax and
have a taxable income of more than €250,000 (joint
filers: €500,000), the marginal tax burden after the
reform is 3 percentage points higher as a result of the
“tax on the rich”. Under this unfavourable constella-
tion, the marginal tax burden exceeds the total tax
burden of an incorporated firm.
A marginal analysis does, however, not provide an
entirely realistic picture. The progressive character of
the income tax must also be taken into consideration
as well as the resulting average tax rates. For this rea-
son the following calculation for a partnership with a
profit of €55,000 is provided. For reasons of simplicity
it is assumed that the separately filing business has no
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Figure 2
21 Results of simulations using model firms by Spengel, Elschner,
Grünewald and Reister (2007) confirm this view.
22 Endres, Spengel and Reister (2007).
23 As already explained, the tax to be paid with a municipal rate of
380 percent is precisely 3.8 times the trade tax assessment amount.
At the same time the income tax burden (according to Art. 35
German Income Tax Law) decreases by 3.8 times the trade tax
assessment amount (at most by the amount of the determined
trade tax). In this case the trade tax to be paid and the income tax
relief cancel each other out.
24 The scope of this study were municipalities with more than
50,000 inhabitants (see also Endres, Spengel and Reister (2007)).
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other source of income. The simulation is conducted
for tax factors of the local trade tax of 400 percent and
490 percent (highest rate in Germany), respectively.
Table 2 illustrates that under a tax factor of 400 per-
cent for the local trade tax hardly any changes for
partnerships or sole proprietorships occur. Under
the currently highest municipal rate in Germany
(Munich) of 490 percent an additional tax burden of
725.03 is calculated. The choice of business location
within Germany thus becomes an important para-
meter for firm politics.25
As an alternative situation, we examined the impact
of the tax reform for a clearly higher income of
€200,000, again, for a separate
filing business and for a tax fac-
tor for the local trade tax of
either 400 or 490 percent, re-
spectively (Table 3).
We find that the effect of the tax
factor on the effective tax bur-
den of a non-corporate firm is
even stronger as the income of
the considered business or part-
nership rises. Under a tax factor
of only 400 percent the business
or partnership faces a tax re-
lief, while under a tax factor of
490 percent the tax burden is
substantially larger compared to
the old situation. Those who
tend to benefit mostly from the
reform, ceteris paribus, are businesses or partner-
ships with higher income.
Thus there is no uniform result regarding the impact
of the tax reform on partnerships and sole propri-
etorships. Tax treatment depends on a business’
income and the municipal assessment rate it is sub-
ject to. In any case, a clear tax relief for these busi-
nesses is not apparent.
In principle, the corporate tax reform offers the possi-
bility of reducing the marginal tax burden on retained
profits. However, due to the rules for subsequent tax-
ation, this alternative is less attractive. To be sure, the
direction of the reform is aimed at promoting
retained profits. But unlike the
case for incorporated firms, the
incentives for retaining profits in
the firm are not as strong.
Moreover, the unequal treat-
ment of capital gains for busi-
nesses (subject to the progres-
sive tax rate) and for private
assets (subject to the withhold-
ing tax) creates an incentive to
withdraw liquidity from a busi-
ness, which tends to weaken the
equity capital base also for part-
nerships.26 This leads to prefer-
Table 2 
Tax burden on business income before and after the reform*
Municipal rate 400% Municipal rate 490%
Before
reform
After 
reform
Before
reform
After 
reform
Profit before tax 55,000.00 55,000.00 55,000.00 55,000.00
Business tax –1,982.14 –4,270.00 –2,370.97 –5,230.75
Income tax (basic rate) –14,353.00 –15,186.00 –14,190.00 –15,186.00
Solidarity surcharge –789.42 –835.23 –780.45 –835.23
Imputation of trade tax 891.96 4,056.50 870.97 4,056.50
Total tax –16,232.59 –16,234.73 –16,470.45 –17,195.48
Net income 38,767.41 38,765.27 38,529.55 37,804.52
Reform impact
(+ = burden, – = relief) +2.14 +725.03
Effective tax rate in % 29.51 29.52 29.95 31.26
* Assuming 55,000 of profits and tax factors for the local trade tax of 400
or 490 percent, respectively.
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Table 3  
Tax burden for business income before and after the reform*
Municipal rate 400% Municipal rate 490%
Before
reform
After
reform
Before
reform
After
reform
Profit before tax 200,000.00 200,000.00 200,000.00 200,000.00
Business tax –25,250.00 –24,570.00 –29,813.25 –30,098.25
Income tax (basic rate) –65,481.00 –76,086.00 –63,564.00 –76,086.00
Solidarity surcharge –3,601.46 –4,184.73 –3,496.02 –4,184.73
Imputation of trade tax 11,362.50 23,341.50 10,951.81 23,341.50
Total tax –82,969.96 –81,499.23 –85,921.47 –87,027.48
Net income 117,030.05 118,500.77 114,078.53 112,972.52
Reform impact
(+ = burden, – = relief) –1,470.73 +1,106.01
Effective tax rate in % 41.48 40.75 42.96 43.51
* Assuming 200,000 of profits and tax factors for the local trade tax of 400 or
490 percent, respectively.
Source: Authors’ calculations. 25 Endres, Spengel and Reister (2007).
26 Endres, Spengel and Reister (2007).
ential treatment of external financing, since busi-
nesses’ interest expenses reduce the highly progres-
sive income tax liability, and interest on withdrawn
profits of the partnership are only taxed at the lower
withholding tax rate.
Conclusion 
With an additional reduction of the tax rate for
incorporated firms and a partial restriction of the
deductibility of debt interest, the German govern-
ment in its corporate tax reform of 2008 has fol-
lowed the principles of a tax-cut-cum-base-broad-
ening approach. In the light of increasing tax com-
petition and the active profit shifting of multina-
tional firms, this kind of reform was long overdue
in order to react adequately to the challenges of
globalisation.
A positive feature of the 2008 corporate tax reform
is that by lowering the tax burden for incorporated
firms, Germany has considerably improved its
position in international tax competition and is
now fit for the challenges of the globalisation pro-
cess. With regard to the other elements of the
reform, however, a more ambivalent picture emer-
ges. What we have is anything but a consistent
reform with a clear direction, apart from the reduc-
tion of the corporate tax rate.
Even though with the lowering of the corporate tax
the investment wedge at the firm level has been
considerably reduced with the introduction of the
withholding tax on capital gains a double taxation
of incorporated firm profits was introduced. As a
consequence of the 2008 corporate tax reform, both
real investment is at a considerable disadvantage
vis-à-vis financial investment, and the overall
investment activity by corporate firms is negatively
affected.
Regarding the taxation of internal vs external capi-
tal, no clear conclusion can be reached. The intro-
duction of the thin capitalisation rule does increase
the cost of debt finance – but only for companies
with very high interest payments. With the trade tax,
however, the treatment of debt finance in the tax
rules is improved. At the same time the introduction
of the final withholding tax will create a stronger
tendency among investors to grant external capital
instead of own equity capital. In the light of the
structurally weak equity capital base of German
firms, the effects of the reform are even more coun-
terproductive. Finally it should be noted that part-
nerships and sole proprietorships will under certain
circumstances even face a higher tax burden after
the reform, and the relief effects of the reform will
go especially to incorporated firms at the firm level.
The introduction of the final withholding tax on div-
idends and capital gains will tend to have a struc-
turally conserving effect for domestic equity holders.
For foreign equity holders, who are exclusively inter-
ested in the definitive taxation at the firm level, the
significant reduction in the corporate tax rate is
extremely welcome.
To summarize, the reform lacks a clear direction. Its
individual components often work in conflicting
ways, so that in many parts the reform appears to be
patchwork.
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